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Microbiological contamination of drinking water supplies is an ever-present concern for water utility 17 
managers.  Most such threats are routine, well-recognised and described. Therefore, they can usually 18 
be prevented using standard protection measures.  Incidents involving emerging pathogens and 19 
malicious attacks are inherently less predictable.   In a multi-stage process over one day, participants 20 
with backgrounds in microbiology, medicine, infrastructure, data analysis, environmental or public 21 
health and facility management developed qualitative scenarios on potential threats posed by either 22 
an emergent pathogen in or a microbiological attack on drinking water supplies in a European country. 23 
Participants were guided via structured activities to identify key factors that would impact the 24 
magnitude and severity of such an emergency.  Plausible variant states for each key factor were 25 
determined, and participants constructed sequences of events to create scenario outlines.  Five 26 
scenarios in outline form are reported which incorporate genuine future events as well as pathogens 27 
of international concern. Common features that would exacerbate all scenarios were: under-28 
investment in public services, inadequate water quality testing and monitoring and lack of resources 29 
to keep water supplies safe.  Participant evaluation of their scenario planning experience was broadly 30 
very positive and the scenario planning process was received as credible and relevant. 31 
 32 
 33 
Keywords: scenario planning, water safety, emerging diseases, contamination, health protection 34 
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 36 
Introduction and aims 37 
The prospect of microbiological contamination of drinking water supplies is an ever-present concern 38 
for managers of public water supplies.  Most such threats are routine, well-recognised and described, 39 
and thus can usually be prevented using standard protection measures.  Incidents involving emerging 40 
pathogens and attacks, however, are inherently less predictable.  Either because by definition 41 
emerging pathogens are not well understood, or because of deliberate planning by attackers to hide 42 
their actions and maximise surprise.  Vulnerability of municipal water supplies to such events is a topic 43 
of ongoing concern. (Haimes et al. 1998, Clark & Deininger 2000, Qiao et al. 2007, Gleick & Heberger 44 
2014, Mutchek & Williams 2014).  Documented plots to deliberately contaminate drinking water 45 
supplies in the period 1946-2015 were described by Brainard and Hunter (2016).  Literature about 46 
emerging diseases in drinking water is more expansive and diverse and tends to be segregated by 47 
species, groups of similar microbes or parasites, outbreak context or types of control methods.  For 48 
instance, a worldwide review of protozoa outbreaks is in Baldursson and Karanis (2011).   Sinclair et 49 
al. (2009) undertook a structured literature review to search for and report on virus-disease outbreaks 50 
in recreational waters. 51 
 52 
Emerging diseases (ED) refer to poorly understood, often relatively recently discovered pathogens for 53 
which our understanding of the risks posed to public health through environmental routes of 54 
transmission are not well understood.  Concerns about ED and potential mitigation measures overlap 55 
greatly with concerns about and possible strategies to resist deliberate contamination of water 56 
supplies (such as for terrorist reasons).  This report documents the methods and outcomes from a 57 
meeting designed to help prepare for both possible threats.  58 
 59 
Scenarios have been described as “Stories that can help us recognise and adapt to changing aspects 60 
of our present environment. They form a method for articulating the different pathways that might 61 
exist and identify plausible steps to move down each of those possible paths“  (Schwartz 1996).  62 
Scenario planning can have a positive impact on decision quality in response to uncertain and rapidly 63 
developing situations (Meissner & Wulf 2013).  Scenario development is the first step towards 64 
identifying strategies that result in robust decision making in multi-faceted situations with high 65 
uncertainty about possible risks (Kwakkel et al. 2016).  As part of the exercise, our participants learned 66 
many concepts typically involved in structured approaches to scenario construction.  Drawing on 67 
methods used in other published scenario building events, our approach was pragmatic and adapted 68 
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so as to be completed in one day and potentially easily replicated in participants‘  own organisations 69 




European professionals with expertise in water safety, water provision, water-borne diseases and 74 
envirionmental protection were invited to attend a workshop that was designed to create an active 75 
participatory meeting.  The workshop format was a short plenary session followed by smaller group 76 
collaborative work (in parallel), with a final plenary session at the end of the afternoon.  All participants 77 
were allocated to either the Emerging Diseases (ED) or Attack (AtK) groups by event organisers.  A 78 
subject expert was purposefully placed in each group (acting as both participant and topic expert), in 79 
case of technical queries that the facilitators could not answer. Our sessions were normative-80 
participatory in nature, which means they consolidated multiple theories and concepts for participant 81 
engagement (Steinmüller 1997). 82 
 83 
Theoretical foundation 84 
Scenarios are “hypothetical sequence[s] of events constructed for the purpose of focusing attention 85 
on causal processes and decision points” (Kahn & Wiener 1967). Thus, scenarios are hypothetical but 86 
still outlined and concrete (Wilson 1978).  Scenario planning is suited to developing multiple 87 
alternatives of possible futures taking into consideration unlikely futures with unknown probability of 88 
actually occurring.  These are relatively extreme events, so-called very rarely expected ‘Black Swans’. 89 
Alternative scenarios can be used to explore possible tipping points and thus interventions that might 90 
disrupt multiple negative scenarios.  Because the scenarios we sought to develop were anticipatory in 91 
nature, we used a participatory-normative approach to scenario planning.  There is little to no 92 
formalisation in this type of scenario planning unlike in forecasting and trend exploration (Steinmüller 93 
1997).  94 
 95 
Given the short time-frame, our scenarios were brief outlines, rather than fully developed and written 96 
versions.  They were semi-global, taking into consideration wider contextual issues but remaining 97 
close to the original topic. The scenarios were fully qualitative. We used an intentional interpretation 98 
of the scenario, which assumes that the scenario is not the text developed by the participants but 99 
rather the blueprint of the future developed by them. 100 
  101 
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Core concepts 102 
 Key factors and key factor analysis: Key factors are those factors that define the outcome of 103 
an event. They need to be highly important (i.e. must have strong impact) and uncertain (i.e. 104 
not definite, such as the force of gravity on Earth). 105 
 Silent sorting: applicable at stage of nomination and grouping of possible key factors.  The 106 
process is done in silence to encourage multiplicity of perspectives. 107 
 Key factor variants: A variant of a key factor is a variable status that the factor could take (i.e. 108 
if a key factor is climate, variants could be hot and dry, cold and wet, cold and dry, etc.) 109 
 Backcasting: Backcasting is the process to link the (future) scenario with the present. 110 
Backcasting starts at the point of the scenario (in our case 2023) and describes events in 111 
reverse order, going backwards from future to the present. It is the opposite of forecasting 112 
and seeks to develop pivotal points that lead to a scenario becoming reality or not. 113 
 114 
Implementation 115 
Prior to the workshop, fixed conditions for each scenario were decided by the facilitators. These fixed 116 
conditions are parameters that cannot be changed during the scenario planning process, and serve to 117 
orient the outputs towards prespecified objectives.  Fixed scenario conditions are listed in Table 1. 118 
Figure 1 summarises the steps that participants went through during the workshop. 119 
 120 
 121 
Table 1 | Fixed conditions for building each scenario 122 
 123 
Both Scenarios 
Included conditions Year = 2023, In a water supply that participants are responsible 
for. Within European area. Pathogen is unknown initially. 
Excluded possible factors Any problem more important than whether the water is safe to 
drink, such as concurrent nuclear war, plague-like disease, zombie 
apocalypse, etc.  At discretion of facilitator. 
Respective scenario fixed conditions 
Emerging disease Presence in water is not result of deliberate contamination 
Has been linked to some deaths. 
Attack Deliberate attack confirmed by evidence of break-in, intelligence 
chatter, and linked hospital admissions. 
 124 
  125 
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Objectives explained to participants 
Overview of methods and fixed conditions explained 



































Divide participants still within Attack/ED themes into three subgroups 
 
Each scenario subgroup: Write a scenario by backcasting from future (ie., year 
2023) when all variants are true, to the present year and conditions.   
 
Incorporate feasible ad hoc details to explain how the future variant statuses 
arose, going back in time 
Separately in each of Attack and Emerging Disease groups: 
 
Propose key factors = Important but uncertain aspects of scenario 
 
Sort the key factors into groups (silently) 
 
Suggest links between KF groups (silently) 
 
(Silently) Suggest summary key factors (labelling groups of KF) 
 
Vote for the 4-8 most important key factors 
 
Within each of Attack/ED groups, divide into 4-6 smaller groups to 
address variant states for each key factor 
 
Each subgroup: Decide on four possible variant states for the 4-8 
most important key factors 
 
Each participant: Selects one variant from each KF factor to go into 
three scenarios  
 
 
Rejoin Plenary to share scenarios with others 
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Identification and prioritisation of key factors 157 
For the workshop, we devised an approach that allowed scenarios to be devised quickly (work 158 
progressed from factor identification to simple scenario descriptions in one full working day). 159 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the two scenario groups (attack and emerging 160 
pathogen) with some adjustment made to ensure relatively equal distribution of skills and 161 
representatives from the same organisation(s).  Within each group, participants were asked to identify 162 
all relevant key factors that are likely to influence the scenario they are working on.  These were 163 
written on adhesive notes and stuck to a wall or whiteboard. Duplicate entries were removed and the 164 
participants were asked to check if they could think of any further key factors. Once all key factors 165 
were identified and agreed, participants were asked to look for relationships and interactions between 166 
these factors, with the option of creating groups, over-arching category labels, and relationship 167 
indicators such as arrows (Figure 2).  Participants were allowed to nominate, remove, cluster or 168 
remove from clusters both their own key factors and those contributed by other participants. This was 169 
done in silence (silent sorting).  Any arguments about the validity of a factor or its associations had to 170 
be resolved silently by moving or removing the respective factor. Silence deterred habitual deference 171 
to verbally or personality dominant colleagues and meant that minority voices and alternative 172 
perspectives were more likely to be heard.   173 
 174 
The previous phase allowed the development of a complex network of interrelated key factors.  The 175 
next stage was to identify the most important factors for each scenario. In the voting stage, each 176 
participant was asked to label what, in their opinion, were the four most important factors. The labels 177 
could be applied to a single factor or any combination of factors. A participant could also give all their 178 
votes to the same single factor, if they felt very strongly about it.  The factors with the most votes 179 
were selected for the next step, which was generating variant states for each factor.  A repeat round 180 
of voting was an option in the event of tied votes. 181 
 182 
Factor variants  183 
For each key factor selected, participants were asked to identify four plausible variant states. This was 184 
done in small groups (3-4 people). Examples were given so as to clarify the process. For instance, if 185 
disease transmission is a key factor, examples of variant states could be: very infectious, not very 186 
infectious, waterborne or transmitted by bodily fluids. 187 
 188 
 189 




Figure 2 | Output of silent sorting, clusters of potential key risk factors, with summary topics for 
each group and results of voting (dot stickers) for the most important key factors. 
 190 
 191 
Scenario building   192 
After variants were devised, simple scenario building was demonstrated to participants.  This was 193 
done by going person to person, with each person choosing one variant for each factor, making sure 194 
that the variants selected could plausibly happen together.  After each variant was chosen, that same 195 
variant was not available for the other scenarios.  Once all factor variants were chosen, they were 196 
combined to form a ‘skeleton’ for each scenario. Subsequently, small groups (4-6 persons) worked on 197 
backcasting for their specific scenario, starting in the projected year (2023) and working backwards to 198 
fill in the story of how the scenario might happen from our starting point in late 2017. 199 
 200 
  201 
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Participants’ feedback 202 
A feedback questionnaire was distributed to the participants to assess their opinions about the 203 





Thirty-one participants attended the workshop event in Barcelona, Spain, held on 7 November 2017. 209 
They had expertise in microbiology, medicine, infrastructure, data analysis, environmental and/or 210 
public health and facility management.  Most worked for water companies, universities or 211 
government agencies.  Most were professionally based in Spain, but there were participants 212 
concurrently working in seven other countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, 213 
Portugal and UK.  Fifteen experts were placed in the emerging pathogen group, and sixteen in the 214 
attack group. 215 
 216 
Factors and variants 217 
The key factors and variants chosen by the participants for the emerging pathogen (ED) and attack 218 
(AtK) scenarios are shown in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. The ED group identified eight key factors, 219 
while the AtK group identified five. For each key factor, four variants were successfully formulated. 220 
Three key factors were shared between the two scenarios, namely emergency response, 221 
communications and pathogen characteristics/ source. Interestingly, the scope of these factors was 222 
described somewhat differently between the two groups, which is very much allowed within scenario 223 
planning methods. The ED group members were quite concerned with pathogen characteristics 224 
(infectious dose and inactivation methods) and modes of transmission, while the AtK group 225 
considered pathogen characteristics as a mix of pathogen types. One variant for source of pathogen 226 
(variant 4) included infectious dose, persistence and incubation period. Similarly, communication 227 
strategies identified by the ED group were multi-faceted and revolved around the efficacy of a 228 
potential crisis committee, interaction with media and political influences.  Conversely, the AtK group 229 
described only the outcome of whatever communication efforts were in place. The key factor variants 230 
were poor, perfect, disastrous, etc.  This was also the case for the key factor emergency response. The 231 
AtK group derived variants such as none, incomplete and complete. The ED group categorised the 232 
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emergency response and defined three key areas: health systems, official communication and 233 
compliance. All three components were considered while deriving variants (Table 2 and 3). The AtK 234 
group considered access to healthcare as a stand-alone key factor. Finally, the AtK group identified 235 
areas that were exposed to the contaminated water as a key factor. This is particularly relevant 236 
considering the uncertainties about the scale of the malicious attack. 237 
 238 
Outline Scenarios 239 
When building the scenarios, one group found scenario construction too difficult; they were inclined 240 
to think that detection methods (genomic analysis, specifically) made their scenario too unlikely to 241 
happen.  However, five of the scenarios (two emerging disease and three attack) were well enough 242 
developed to be reported here.  It was commonly mentioned in all scenarios that lack of resources or 243 
policy changes that led to poor equipment maintenance or substandard monitoring of contamination 244 
or other reduced microbe control measures could considerably exacerbate the worst impacts of any 245 
threat scenario.  All scenarios had to make plausible assumptions about decisions and policies adopted 246 
by health systems, governments and others.  Policy changes could be to reduce frequency of testing, 247 
remove types of testing, remove chlorine from water.  Some of the suggested details in all of the 248 
scenarios are sensitive, especially the specific mechanics of how an attack could happen.  For this 249 
reason, and for brevity, we publish here only the timelines for each scenario, which start five years in 250 
the future and work backwards to present day.  The variants used to build each scenario are listed in 251 




26/31 (84%) individuals returned completed questionnaires to the organisers.  Feedback was broadly 256 
very positive (see Table 4). 257 
 258 
  259 
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Table 2 | Factors and variants chosen and for the emerging diseases scenarios 260 
 
Key Factor 







AR: Just the already 
ill, young, very old 
Mb: Only a few 
people who are sick 
will have severe 
illness 




1/10,000 gets ill 
Mb: Symptoms more 
severe but not lethal; 
care at home 
possible 
Mt: Folk w/ weak 
immune systems 
most at risk 
AR: disease is 
communicable; 
requires quarantine 
Mb: Symptoms are 
severe, infected need 
monitoring & 
treatment 
Mt: higher mortality 





are very severe, 
fast progression 
Mt: Risk of death 





Health systems (HS) 











HS are coping, official 
communications not 
effective, people 
expected to comply 
with instructions 
High demand on 
HS, official 
communications 
will be very 
forceful, people 
are expected to 
have poor 
compliance 
Transmission Waterborne only Waterborne spread 
& person to person 
Airborne & person to 
person & waterborne 
spread 








containable as route 
is known 
Source identified, but 
cannot be contained 
(route unknown) 
Cannot identify 
source, situation can 
be contained 










liaison with political 
institutions and press 




is supervision of 
media and political 
influences, press 
conferences occur 
Crisis committee is 
organized with 
designated 
spokesperson but no 
social media and 
official 
communication via 
radio or TV 
No crisis 
committee is 










Both Available and 
skilled 
Both available but 
lack skills 




(e.g., on strike), 
no contingency 











Cheap, specific, slow, 
not standardized 
None available 
but other AT 





Low infectious dose, 
inactivated by 
chlorination 
Low infectious dose, 
not inactivated by 
chlorination 









P a g e  | 12 
 
Table 3 | Factors and variants chosen for the attack scenario 263 
   
Key Factor 
























































Disaster in all 
ways 
Good message, 
but at wrong 
people 
Poor targeting led 
to unnecessary 







down due to 
contamination, 









Violence or panic 
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Box 1a | Variants used to construct scenario described in Box 1b 266 
 267 
Box 1b |  Emerging disease scenario (1) 268 
 269 
 270 
  271 
Olympic Games Paris 2024 
 2023: Outbreak in France (1 year before the games) affecting persons already ill, limited 
severity and no fatalities. Pathogen: low infectious dose but inactivated by Chlorine 
 
 2022: Because of the Games, French government increases recreational areas with water 
fountains, playgrounds, more public drinking water fountains 
 
 2021: Summer with high temperatures, linked to increasing pollution after US pulled out 
of Paris Climate Change Convention 
 
 2020: EU allows decrease in Chlorine levels, French water supplies go Chlorine-free 
 
 2019: EU stops investing in new water safety tools and nobody is submitting related 
proposals, strikes because of low salaries, tax increases and pension age increase lead to 
health systems becoming vulnerable and no supervision of social media or official social 
media strategy 
 
 2018: Launches of new platforms and tools for rapid monitoring & pathogen detection 
but health authorities only recognise traditional/conventional methods -> new tools are 
not recognised as gold standard 
 
(Attack rate, morbidity, mortality) AR: Only vulnerable groups are susceptible (young, very old); Mb: Only a few 
people will have severe sickness; Mt: no fatalities expected, disease is treatable 
(Emergency Response) Health systems cannot cope with demand, official communications are effective, can 
expect good public compliance with instructions 
(Transmission) Varies due to season and vulnerability of individuals 
(Identification of outbreak and source) Source identified, but cannot be contained as route unknown 
(Communications) Crisis committee is organised.  There is a designated spokesperson but no social media or 
official media communication via TV, radio, printed press 
(Human resources) None (eg., due to strikes), plus no contingency plan, lack of skilled personnel 
(Analytical technologies) AT are cheap, but not standardised, are time consuming, are specific 
(Characteristics of pathogen) Low infectious dose, inactivated by chlorination 
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Box 2a |  Variants used to construct scenario described in Box 2b 272 
 273 
Box 2b |  Emerging disease scenario (2) 274 
 275 
  276 
  277 
Everywhere Unknown 
 2023: Large outbreak across EU produced by an Unknown microbe that is transmitted by 
air, person to person, waterborne.  Infection dose is high but microbe is resistant to 
chlorine. 
 
 2022: Repairs are completed that happened after the 2021 overflows, to infrastructure 
for drinking water and waste water.  However, this meant large investments that diverted 
resources away from research and development. 
 
 2021: Big overflows overwhelm drinking and waste water infrastructure (causing huge 
damage); concurrent critical economic situation. 
 
 2019; Crisis committee identified the problem (partly) and communicated to public health 
agencies how they should treat future cases. 
 
 2017: Sporadic cases of an unknown opportunistic microbe, virulence of which depends 
on environmental conditions (unknown). 
 
 
(Attack rate, morbidity, mortality) AR: High transmission rate; Mb: Symptoms are very severe, fast progression; 
Mt: Risk of death increases if no treatment within 72 h 
(Emergency Response) High demand on health services, official communications are very forceful, people are 
expected to have poor compliance 
(Transmission) Airborne and person to person and waterborne 
(Identification of outbreak and source) Cannot identify, but can be contained 
(Communications) Organised crisis committee has designated, spokesperson official who answers to social 
media and there is agreement among political institutions who are included in the crisis committee.  There are 
official communications with the press 
(Human resources) There are resources available, contingency plan available, skills are available 
(Analytical technologies) None suitable for pathogen, but other AT could be adapted 
(Characteristics of pathogen) High infectious dose required, is NOT inactivated by chlorination 
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Box 3a |  Variants used to construct scenario described in Box 3b 278 
 279 
Box 3b | Attack scenario (3) 280 
 281 
  282 
283 
Disgruntled Employee 
• 2023: City-wide outbreak with medium impact not detected by normal control systems 
during especially severe flu season which is overcrowding hospitals.  However, there is 
good communication and a complete response plan (despite the lack of trained 
personnel) 
• 2023: Bad guy makes attack plan, does not want to kill but expose company as unready.  
Gets pathogen from black market source. 
• 2022: Bad guy gets fired from water supply Company 
• 2020: New detection kits become available and are incorporated into response plans, no 
resources to train personnel with new kits 
• 2017: Water supply company realises that traditional communications are no longer valid 
and make new plans using newer communications  media 
 
(Inter-agency cooperation and emergency response plans) Complete, but personnel not trained 
(Source of pathogen) Not detected by normal control systems 
(Areas of water reached) City wide, medium impact, chlorinated and branched network 
(Communications strategy & management of general public) Perfect communications in every way 
(Access to Health Care) Hospitals are overcrowded 
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Box 4a |  Variants used to construct scenario in Box 4b 284 
 285 
Box 4b |  Attack scenario (4) 286 
  287 
Dystopia 2023 
 2023: Unknown actors contaminate water supply to the National Assembly building and 
surrounding area, using multiple different pathogens some of which are hard to identify. 
Appears politically motivated. Response is poorly managed with different agencies not co-
operating.  Inter-agency co-operation break-down because Health Dept. does not want to 
reveal internally known weaknesses in staffing levels. Security services (civil protection) 
didn’t communicate the known risk to the water system to avoid revealing weaknesses in 
their system and their capabilities. There is high degree of inter-service rivalry in the 
background exasperated by a recent funding crisis. Multiple conflicting messages are sent by 
each agency to the media by different services to try to make their agency visible to the 
public.  The mix of pathogens suggests this attack is backed by a highly sophisticated sponsor 
(could be State or well-resourced internal opposition). This sponsor sows additional 
confusion by using other assets to spread misinformation online 
 
• Late 2022: Budget crisis due to lack of political direction and divided National Assembly 
 
• Early 2022: Victorious political party is mired in corruption scandals left over from the 
election and does not command a majority. Money seems to be going missing or is not 
spent effectively. Public services (hospitals and public health in particular) are being shut 
down or reduced in services they offer due to lack of money 
 
• Late 2021: Disputed and acrimonious election with many claims of corruption. Very little 
trust in politicians. Some indications of external interference in the elections 
 
• Early 2021: Government falls following release of emails from parliamentary systems 
showing high levels of misbehaviour in public office (fiscal and other) 
 
• Late 2020: Corrosive atmosphere to public; each political party seems to only represent 
narrow interests 
 
• 2019: Increasing polarisation in the media. Increasing effect of “filter bubbles” in people’s 
online life. Increasing intolerance of views different to one’s own. Attempts to rewrite 
history by removal of public monuments and statues 
(Inter-agency cooperation and emergency response plans) Incomplete inter-agency co-operation 
(Source of pathogen) Mix of pathogens 
 (Areas of water reached) Small area, high impact, chlorinated, reticulated 
(Communications strategy & management of general public) Complete disaster 
(Access to Health Care) Hospitals are shutting down due to complications from staff shortages 
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Box 5a |  Variants used to construct scenario described in Box 5b 288 
 289 
Box 5b |  Attack scenario (5)  290 
 291 
 292 
  293 
Ebola in Europe 
• 2023: Attack on water supplies (Ebola virus injected into storage tanks) in large city in 
target European country.  There is chaos with public panic, widespread misinformation 
about risks, impacts and safety measures that public can take.   
• Late 2022: West African terrorists invite and help middle Eastern terrorists to collect and 
concentrate Ebola virus from faeces (suicide missions) 
• Early 2022: Large Ebola outbreak starts in populous West African country   
• 2018-2023: Debt crisis, cut in public services in target country.  Leads to poor quality 
hospital services and few resources to maintain good quality public communications.  
Emergency response plans forgotten or abandoned or become very out of date.  Capital 
investment in protecting and maintaining water supply network is especially badly 
affected, in large European city (or cities). 
 
(Inter-agency cooperation and emergency response plans) None 
(Source of pathogen) Virus eradicated or uncommon in Europe 
 (Areas of water reached) City wide, medium impact, 30% of supply not chlorinated, reticulated 
(Communications strategy & management of general public) Poor targeting leading to unnecessary public scare, total 
chaos 
(Access to Health Care) Violence or panic inside and around hospital 
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Table 4 |  Results of feedback questionnaire 294 
Criteria Results 
This workshop was relevant to my needs 
 
81% agreed or strongly agreed 
This workshop met my expectations 
 
70% agreed or strongly agreed 
This workshop helped me understand scenario 
planning better 
 
97% agreed or strongly agreed 
I enjoyed this workshop and I am glad I came to it 
 
100% agreed or strongly agreed 
I understood what to do in each phase of today’s 
workshop, I didn’t feel confused. 
 
31% agreed or strongly agreed 
(46% unsure) 
The content was well-organised 
 
84% agreed or strongly agreed 
The workshop has made me think about unusual 
risks in a helpful way 
 
80% agreed or strongly agreed 
(20% unsure) 
This workshop identified risk factors I never 
thought of before  
 
50% agreed or strongly agreed 
(46% unsure) 
The workshop made me feel better able to prepare 
for future unusual events 
 
50% agreed or strongly agreed 
(42% unsure) 
I could adapt these scenario methods to use in my 
own organization. 
 
76% agreed or strongly agreed 
(20% unsure) 
This workshop helped me see how to reduce 
possible impacts or better manage relevant risks at 
work 




Discussion  297 
We describe a set of procedures for running a one-day workshop to facilitate experts to envision a 298 
range of plausible scenarios that could threaten water supplies they are tasked to protect.  Although 299 
the threats poised here were purely biological, the methods could easily be adapted to consider other 300 
hazards, such as chemical or radiological threats.  Readers can judge for themselves if a similar 301 
workshop would be valuable to run within their organisation. The workshop steps described here are 302 
not definitively the best way to undertake such a workshop; we describe ways to improve the 303 
implementation below.  Neither were our resulting scenarios definitive; a different set of experts 304 
probably would have identified somewhat different key factors and developed possibly quite different 305 
scenarios.  The choices of key factors and how participants imagined scenarios was heavily influenced 306 
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by their own backgrounds (and therefore could be very country-specific).  Nevertheless, we hope that 307 
our account and comments about implementation may be useful to others pondering whether to run 308 
similar planning exercises within their own organisations, in order to inform local risk assessment.  309 
Some of our observations described below seem likely to be very generalizable to many settings, with 310 
regard to protecting water supplies.  A valuable outcome of scenario planning exercises like ours is 311 
going beyond worst and best case scenarios; looking for extremes is prone to strong human biases.  312 
There are an infinite number of scenarios for any one topic, and scenarios need to be adaptable to 313 
local conditions in order to be credible and not just very unlikely extremes.  The intermediate steps in 314 
the methods we describe can also be a constructive exercise for those involved in water protection, 315 
such as identifying key factors (inherently important and uncertain), and the use of silent decision 316 
making (the silent sorting methods which encourage the widest range of views to emerge). 317 
 318 
 319 
Real world implications 320 
Participants found it difficult to plausibly imagine these scenarios except in an environment where 321 
protection measures and communications strategies were significantly inadequate.  This is 322 
encouraging as it suggests an inverse situation is true in the group opinion: the scenarios were very 323 
unlikely as long as regulatory standards remain high, and monitoring and accountability mechanisms 324 
are well-resourced.  Some of the participants with microbiology backgrounds felt strongly that 325 
genomic analysis would ensure very rapid identification of pathogen characteristics, so much so that 326 
delay in identification or difficulties in planning a management strategy would be negligible.  327 
Developments in genomic methods may indeed facilitate quicker removal from water supplies.  328 
However, the converse is also true.  In an environment with inadequate safety controls, insufficient 329 
laboratory methods, poor resources or monitoring, the participants easily imagined a high diversity of 330 
ways that an emerging disease or attack could be highly disruptive to provision of safe drinking water 331 
in Europe. 332 
 333 
Among the many policy changes that could increase likelihood of an emerging pathogen or successful 334 
attack were: declines in capital investment, delays in repairing infrastructure, prioritising other public 335 
services or promoting public preferences (such as having less chlorine taste in drinking water), as well 336 
as reduced intra-agency cooperation. The participants thought such policy changes were unlikely but 337 
not impossible, especially given the ever-present pressure on public services to be cost-effective.  338 
Policies that would reduce negative scenario impacts were to  maintain effective communications with 339 
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the public and between relevant agencies, as well as well-defined strategies to make water quality 340 
testing easier, quicker, more specific and yet still cost-effective. 341 
 342 
 343 
Event Implementation 344 
The facilitators see many ways that the methods could have been concisely and clearly better 345 
explained.  We were not prepared for how systematically and thoroughly the participants wanted to 346 
approach the task of choosing variants: we should have been firmer about insisting that they think of 347 
variants in concise terms.  Many participants tried to devise elaborate scenarios as backstories for a 348 
possible variant, before they could decide on each variant option.  It is certainly possible to dedicate 349 
an entire day to decide on factor variants, but for the purposes of scenario building in a one-day 350 
workshop, the variants only needed to be possible, rather than especially plausible.  The time spent 351 
developing and identifying possible backstory details for the variants was still productive, ultimately, 352 
because these details were useful when fleshing out details during the scenario building stage. 353 
 354 
Operational perspectives  355 
In plenary discussion afterwards, attendees raised further observations about testing regimes.  They 356 
commented that current methods for water quality testing are well suited for the required regulatory 357 
monitoring.  However, deference to regulatory standards somewhat acts as a deterrent to trying new 358 
or more sensitive testing methods; since the new methods wouldn’t be required and may represent 359 
an unnecessary and unreimbursed cost.  There are also problems with accepting results from new 360 
techniques because of their lack of correspondence with data accumulated from conventional 361 
monitoring.  Some methods are associated with different error patterns (such as higher numbers of 362 
false positives), and thus require sensitive decision making with regard to when an alert truly needed 363 
to be raised. 364 
 365 
The regulatory sector should be receptive to new methods, but getting new methods into practice is 366 
often a slow process because of conservationism in the sector.  Additional limitations are the usually 367 
high cost of newly developed methods.  Therefore, the participants agreed that a distinction should 368 
be made between regulatory compliance and operational monitoring.  It was suggested that a first 369 
step in operational implementation is event monitoring.  This has been trialled since late 2017 in Spain 370 
(Brainard et al. 2018).   371 
 372 
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Relatively new technologies such as whole genome sequencing for typing and source tracking are 373 
relevant.  These techniques offer value in outbreak investigation for tracing sources of contamination 374 
but are unlikely to be unsuitable for routine application in environmental sampling, as the large 375 
amounts of data generated could not necessarily be linked to health risks in humans.  Microbial source 376 
tracking  and whole genome sequencing techniques have been developed (Hjelmsø et al. 2017) which 377 
may be very valuable in bioterrorist attack investigations.  Water quality testing strategies can be most 378 
protective when implemented in a tiered approach, such that test results are enhanced by 379 
complementary information from multiple sources (Rickert et al. 2014, Ryzinska-Paier et al. 2014).   380 
 381 
Limitations 382 
As observed previously, the key factors and scenarios identified by our participants cannot be 383 
definitive and may not all be generalizable, instead they are the products of the procedures as 384 
described.  With regard to our procedures, we have tried to explain them clearly and be candid about 385 
what could be improved.  We did not subject the workshop or the outputs to a rigorous evaluation 386 
scheme.  Checklists for evaluating quality of participatory scenario planning exercises are not well-387 
developed, but many resources exist from which such a checklist could be derived, some of which are 388 
contextualised with regard to water safety.  Acosta Tellez (2014) describes different scenario planning 389 
approaches and their strengths and weaknesses when assessed against many evaluation criteria.  390 
Scott et al. (2012) described how scenario planning must identifying important but uncertain factors, 391 
their impacts and ultimately key adaptations to reduce risks of harm.  Both Mott Lacroix et al. (2015) 392 
and Van der Merwe (2008) advocated that scenario planning exercises should produce outputs that 393 
are challenging, relevant and plausible; we believe that our scenario planning had many if not all of 394 
these attributes. 395 
 396 
Conclusions 397 
The scenario building workshop fostered increased awareness of possible risks to water supplies.  The 398 
methods comprise a process that has credibility for participants by creating a multiplicity of 399 
considered perspectives in the process of identifying what are the key uncertain and important 400 
factors, and their possible variant states, that could have a high impact on the proposed problem 401 
situation.  This meeting encouraged health and industry experts to identify vulnerabilities and novel 402 
pathways for an emerging disease or attack to threaten water supplies.  Very positive feedback about 403 
the experience was received, even among those participants who found their scenario was very 404 
unlikely.  Scenario building could be used to inform Water Safety Plans (Bridle et al. 2014, Ryzinska-405 
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Paier et al. 2014, Gunnarsdottir et al. 2016, Gunnarsdottir et al. 2017) for better risk assessment and 406 
to improve protection of public water supplies.   407 
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APPENDIX 1 511 
        Evaluation Form 512 
Please complete the evaluation for today’s workshop – your feedback is valuable. 513 
Topic =  Emerging Infectious Disease    Deliberate Attack  514 
 515 
You do not need to write your name on this form, we want your honest opinions.  Please tick how 516 








This Workshop was relevant to my 
needs 
     
This workshop met my expectations      
This workshop helped me 
understand scenario planning better 
     
I enjoyed this workshop and I am 
glad I came to it 
     
I understood what to do in each 
phase of today’s workshop, I didn’t 
feel confused. 
     
The content was well-organised      
The workshop has made me think 
about unusual risks in a helpful way 
     
This workshop identified risk factors 
I never thought of before  
     
The workshop made me feel better 
able to prepare for future unusual 
events 
     
I could adapt these scenario 
methods to use in my own 
organization. 
     
This workshop helped me see how 
to reduce possible impacts or better 
manage relevant risks at work 
     
 519 
We will NOT share any identifying information about you.  Nor will we publish explicit details of the risk factor 
variants that were identified in today’s workshop.  However, for evaluation and research purposes, do you consent 
for your anonymous replies on this form and other anonymous contributions to this workshop that are not useful 
to would-be attackers, to be shared more widely, with UEA researchers, our research partners and others? (please 
delete any category that you do not want to have access to your feedback and contributions): 
Yes    No 
Do you have any other comments, such as what could we have improved, or what did you especially like 
today? 
 
 
